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INCOMPATIBILISM, SIN,
AND FREE WILL IN HEAVEN
Timothy Pawl and Kevin Timpe

The traditional view of heaven holds that the redeemed in heaven both have
free will and are no longer capable of sinning. A number of philosophers
have argued that the traditional view is problematic. How can someone be
free and yet incapable of sinning? If the redeemed are kept from sinning,
their wills must be reined in. And if their wills are reined in, it doesn’t seem
right to say that they are free. Following James Sennett, we call this objection
to the traditional view of heaven ‘the Problem of Heavenly Freedom’. In this
paper, we discuss and criticize four attempts to respond to the Problem of
Heavenly Freedom. We then offer our own response to this problem which
both preserves the traditional view of heaven and avoids the objections which
beset the other attempts.

Neither are we to suppose that because sin shall have no
power to delight them [i.e., the redeemed], free will must
be withdrawn. It will, on the contrary, be all the more
truly free, because set free from delight in sinning to take
unfailing delight in not sinning. For the first freedom of
will which man received when he was created upright
consisted in an ability not to sin, but also in an ability to
sin; whereas this last freedom of will shall be superior,
inasmuch as it shall not be able to sin.
—Saint Augustine1

Introduction
According to traditional Christianity, God endowed humans with free will.
And because humans possess free will, it is possible that they choose to sin,
as they, unfortunately, did. Hence, the Fall. Christian tradition also holds
that despite human sin, God provides for the justification and sanctification of sinners. As a result, those sinful humans who accept God’s grace
offered to them in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ can be reconciled to God and share in his everlasting happiness in heaven. These are
the redeemed. Traditionally, Christian theologians and philosophers have
1
Augustine, City of God, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. Marcus Dods (Grand Rapids:
Christian Classics Ethereal Library) XXII.30, http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/
npnf102.html.
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thought that the redeemed will be free (as, for instance, we see Augustine
claiming in the quotation at the beginning of this paper).2 But traditional
Christianity has also affirmed that the redeemed in heaven will not be capable of sinning and are instead morally impeccable.3 It is for this reason
that a second Fall will not be possible. In what follows, we will refer to the
conjunction of the following two theses
(i)

the redeemed in heaven have free will, and

(ii)

the redeemed in heaven are no longer capable of sinning

as the ‘traditional view of heaven,’ or simply ‘the traditional view’.
The traditional view seems to be in internal tension. For instance, one
may wonder: how can someone be free and yet incapable of sinning? If the
redeemed are kept from sinning, their wills must be reined in, at least in
some way. And, if their wills are reined in, it doesn’t seem right to say that
they are free. We will refer to this as the Problem of Heavenly Freedom.4
In this paper, we consider five responses to the Problem of Heavenly
Freedom. The first is the acceptance of compatibilism, the view that an
agent’s free choice is compatible with her being determined to choose
thusly. The second and third responses are strategies of concession: they
both concede that the redeemed in heaven can sin. The second response
says that it is a live possibility that the redeemed sin, and if they do so,
they will fall from heaven. The third response claims that, while the redeemed in heaven can sin, it is not a live option for them to sin, due to
God’s counterfactual guidance based on middle knowledge. The fourth
view is advocated by James Sennett, who offers what he takes to be a
revised form of compatibilism (to anticipate, however, we don’t see it as
a species of compatibilism). While we think that Sennett’s view is good
and interesting, and an improvement over the preceding views, we think
there is more to be said. Sennett’s view is very close to the last view—
ours. We argue that one can be free in heaven but be unable to sin in
2
For other affirmations of heavenly freedom see Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, trans. English Dominicans (New York: Christian Classics, 1981), III q.18 a.4;
and Anselm, On Free Will and De Concordia, section I, chap. 6. Both of these latter
works can be found in Anselm of Canterbury: the Major Works, ed. Brian Davies and
Gill Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). We should note, though, that
upon examination, we haven’t found anywhere where an ecumenical council has
pronounced on whether the redeemed will be free.
3
For a discussion of some of the historical issues here, see Brian E. Daley, The
Hope of the Early Church: A Handbook of Patristic Eschatology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) and Simon Francis Gaine, Will there Be Free Will
in Heaven?: Freedom, Impeccability and Beatitude (London: T & T Clark Ltd., 2003).
According to Gaine, “that impeccability belongs to the orthodox Christian concept
of heaven is . . . beyond any doubt” (p. 11). A recent paper on this topic states that
“it seems to us that the claim that there is evil in Heaven [or can be sin in heaven]
simply runs counter to orthodox belief in these matters. . . . It is part of the essence
of Heaven that it should be a place in which there is no evil” (Yujin Nagasawa,
Graham Oppy, and Nick Trakakis, “Salvation in Heaven?,” Philosophical Papers
33.1 (2004), pp. 104f., 99.
4
Sennett calls this the dilemma of heavenly freedom. See James F. Sennett, “Is
there Freedom in Heaven?,” Faith and Philosophy 16.1 (1999), p. 69.
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virtue of having a moral character that one has previously freely formed.
On our view, while an agent must have alternative possibilities open to
her at some time in order to be free, the agent need not always have
alternative possibilities open to her. She may freely form her character
such that she can’t choose not to perform some particular action at a later
time, and nevertheless do the latter action freely. The view that we offer
retains all the benefits of the previous four and avoids all the objections
we raise to them.
§1 Compatibilism as a Solution
One way to avoid the Problem of Heavenly Freedom is to understand
freedom in such a way that being determined to will as one does is consistent with being free. If an agent’s being free is consistent with that agent’s
being determined not to sin, then (i) and (ii) above are not inconsistent. For
if God can determine how agents use their free will, then, by determining
them never to sin, he can ensure that the redeemed in heaven do not sin
without taking away their free will. There is historical precedent in Christian history for such a view.5 That said, an affirmation of compatibilism
5
For arguments that Augustine was a compatibilist, see Lynne Rudder Baker,
“Why Christians Should Not Be Libertarians: An Augustinian Challenge,” Faith
and Philosophy 20 (2003), pp. 460–478; Christopher Kirwan, Augustine (London:
Routledge, 1989), p. 118f.; Katherin Rogers, “Does God Cause Sin? Anselm of Canterbury Versus Jonathan Edwards on Human Freedom and Divine Sovereignty,”
Faith and Philosophy 20.3 (2003), pp. 371–378; and Katherin Rogers, “Augustine’s
Compatibilism,” Religious Studies 40 (2004), pp. 415–435. (In an earlier paper, Rogers writes that if anyone could prove that Augustine’s doctrine of the will is not
compatibilist, she would “be grateful” (Katherin Rogers, “The Traditional Doctrine of Divine Simplicity,” Religious Studies 32 (1996), p. 180). Though it is less
clear, Thomas Holtzen also appears to interpret Augustine as a compatibilist in
his “The Therapeutic Nature of Grace in St. Augustine’s De Gratia Et Libero Arbitrio,” Augustinian Studies 31 (2000), pp. 93–115. For arguments that Augustine is an
incompatibilist, see Eleonore Stump, “Augustine and Free Will,” in The Cambridge
Companion to Augustine, ed. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 124–147; Thomas Williams, “Introduction,” in Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will (Hackett, 1993), pp. xi–xix; and John
Davenport, “Aquinas’s Teleological Libertarianism,” in Analytical Thomism: Traditions in Dialogue, ed. Craig Paterson and Matthew Pugh (Burlington, VT: Ashgate,
2006). We should note that it is possible that Augustine was a compatibilist at some
point of his long career and an incompatibilist at some other, as at least one of the
present authors believes.
Jonathan Edwards and John Calvin also endorsed compatibilism. See, for example, Bruce Reichenbach, “Evil and a Reformed View of God,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 24 (1988), pp. 67–85; William Rowe, Can God Be Free?
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); B. A Gerrich, “The Place of Calvin in
Christian Theology,” in The Cambridge Companion to John Calvin, ed. Donald McKim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 289–304; Stephen Daniel, “Edwards as Philosopher,” in The Cambridge Companion to Jonathan Edwards,
ed. Stephen Stein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 162–180;
and Allen Guelzo, “Freedom of the Will,” in The Princeton Companion to Jonathan
Edwards, ed. Sand Hyun Lee (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp.
115–129.
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brings with it well-known problems in giving a satisfactory answer to the
problem of evil. Consider the Free Will Defense to the logical problem
of evil.6 According to the Free Will Defense, the reason that moral evils
do not contradict God’s essential goodness is that it is possible that the
existence of free will (and those additional goods which logically require
that some agents have free will) is such a great good that it justifies the
existence of the moral evil that it makes possible.7
It is hard to see how the Free Will Defense would go on the assumption of compatibilism. On the supposition that free will is compatible with
determinism, God could actualize the good of free will (as well as those
additional goods which logically require that some agents have free will)
without the possibility of moral evil by determining all free creatures
never to do evil. Thus the Free Will Defense to the logical problem of evil
is rendered impotent.
So the supposition of compatibilism makes the logical problem of evil
even more acute than it already is.8 Granted, there are responses to the
logical problem of evil other than the Free Will Defense, and some of these
other responses are compatibilist-friendly. It is not our intention to explore these other responses here; but the Free Will Defense is the most
influential response to the logical problem of evil (and, in our view, an
essential part of any satisfactory response). It is a disadvantage of a response to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom that it worsens another problem for Christianity. It would be better to be able to provide a response
to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom that doesn’t require compatibilism.
In addition, there are good philosophical reasons to reject compatibilism,
although we will not rehearse them here.9 Thus, in what follows, we will
proceed under the assumption of the truth of incompatibilism. We should
6
The locus classicus for the Free Will Defense to the logical problem of evil is Alvin
Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1977). For a more elaborate, and technical, discussion of the same issues, see
also Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974).
7
See, for instance, Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, p. 31: “The heart of the
Free Will Defense is the claim that it is possible that God could not have created a
universe containing moral good (or as much moral good as this world contains)
without creating one that also contained moral evil. And if so, then it is possible
that God has a good reason for creating a world containing evil.”
8
There are, of course, other versions of the problem of evil besides the logical
problem of evil. We aren’t claiming that the Free Will Defense solves all versions of
the problem of evil, just that it succeeds in refuting the logical problem of evil. In
this case, it is perhaps better to say that the assumption of compatibilism gives one
particularly toothy problem of evil more bite than it already has. It could also be
that the truth of incompatibilism makes other problems, including other problems
of evil, more intractable for the Christian theist. Our thanks to Tom Flint for pointing out the need to address this issue.
9
For a particularly influential argument against compatibilism, see the discussion of the Consequence Argument in Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). See also Alicia Finch and Ted Warfield, “The Mind
Argument and Libertarianism,” Mind 107 (1998), pp. 515–528 for an improved version of the Consequence Argument. For one of the present author’s arguments
against compatibilism, see Kevin Timpe, “Why Christians Might be Libertarians: A
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note, though, that if one is a compatibilist, and if one has a viable answer
to the problem of evil that doesn’t rely upon a Free Will Defense, then one
already has an answer to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom without the
cost we associate with this strategy.
§2 The Concession Strategy
Another way to avoid the Problem of Heavenly Freedom is to make a concession. One such concession is to allow for the possibility of sin among
the redeemed. If the redeemed can sin, and their actually sinning is not
continually circumvented in some way (as, for instance, in the way discussed in the third strategy below), then there is the possibility of further
falls from heaven, as Origen posited.10 More recently, John Donnelly has
defended this sort of view.11 According to Donnelly, freedom is essential
to the Christian view of heaven: “to think that when one attains heaven,
due to the achievement of some degree of moral perfection, one no longer
needs to be free, is to misunderstand the Christian notion of heaven.”12
Donnelly thinks the redeemed can choose to use their free will to do evil,
thereby earning an “eviction from Heaven.”13
This method of answering the Problem of Heavenly Freedom has the
benefit of consistency with incompatibilism insofar as one’s free actions
can’t be determined. Also, it does not make the problem of evil more intractable, as the previous solution did.
Even with these benefits, though, we don’t accept this Concession Strategy. For, just as Donnelly says that to think that the redeemed aren’t free
“is to misunderstand the Christian notion of heaven,” we believe that to allow the possibility of heavenly evictions is to misunderstand the Christian
notion of heaven. Presumably for a person to be in a state of heavenly bliss
is for that person to be in such an elevated state of bliss that the person
couldn’t be in a higher state of bliss. The problem with thinking that there
could be eviction from heaven is that it allows for a redeemed individual
to be in a higher state of bliss than he or she is in.
Augustine argues against the Concession Strategy in precisely this
way in his magisterial work, The City of God.14 His argument runs as folReply to Lynne Rudder Baker,” Philosophia Christi 6.2 (2004), pp. 89–98 and Kevin
Timpe, Free Will: Sourcehood and Its Alternatives (London: Continuum, 2008).
10
At least according to Augustine in The City of God, XXI.17.
11
See John Donnelly, “Eschatological Enquiry,” Sophia 24 (1985), pp. 16–31 and
John Donnelly, “Heavenly Eviction,” Philosophy Now, 56 (2006), pp. 27–28.
12
Donnelly, “Eschatological Enquiry,” p. 27.
13
Donnelly, “Heavenly Eviction,” p. 27.
14
In City of God, XI.13, Augustine writes: “From all this, it will readily occur to
anyone that the blessedness which an intelligent being desires as its legitimate
object results from a combination of these two things, namely, that it uninterruptedly enjoy the unchangeable good, which is God; and that it be delivered from all
dubiety, and know certainly that it shall eternally abide in the same enjoyment .
For what catholic Christian does not know that no new devil will ever arise among
the good angels, as he knows that this present devil will never again return into
the fellowship of the good? For the truth in the gospel promises to the saints and
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lows. Heaven is essentially a place of ultimate happiness, and no state is
a state of ultimate happiness if one could be in a different state and be
happier.15 Now, consider two ‘redeemed’ individuals. One experiences
the joys of heaven but isn’t sure that he will be with God forever, since
heavenly eviction is a live possibility for him, and another experiences
those same joys but also has an assurance that she will always be with
God in heaven.16 If we ask ourselves which of these two individuals is
happier, it is clear that certainty of eternal life with God brings more happiness with it than the lack of that certainty. So if heaven is to be the state
of human existence than which none more desirable can be conceived,
it cannot involve even the live possibility of eviction. On this Concession Strategy, one can’t be certain of eternal life with God in everlasting
peace, since eviction is a live possibility. So the Concession Strategy theorist’s heaven isn’t a place of ultimate happiness, and hence is no heaven
worthy of the name.17
to the faithful that they will be equal to the angels of God; and it is also promised
them that they will ‘go away into life eternal.’ But if we are certain that we shall
never lapse from eternal felicity, while they are not certain, then we shall not be
their equals, but their superiors. But as the truth never deceives, and we shall be
their equals, they must be certain of their blessedness.” See also IV.3, XI.4, XII.14
and XXI.17.
15
Tom Flint has rightly pointed out to us that one prominent view of heaven
holds that there are varying levels of happiness among the blessed in heaven.
For instance: “The Catholic Church . . . holds as an article of faith that there are
among the Blessed various degrees of happiness, in proportion to merit. ‘One is
more perfect than the other according to the different merits of each,’ says e.g.
the Decretum Unionis of Florence.” (Joseph Pohle, Eschatology; or, The Catholic Doctrine of the Last Things: A Dogmatic Treatise, trans. Arthur Preuss (St. Louis: Herder
Book Co., 1946), pp. 40–41). Pohle also provides passages from St. Ignatius of Antioch, Tertullian, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas Aquinas that support
the same doctrine. One might think that if there were different levels of bliss in
heaven, then Augustine’s argument we provide here wouldn’t work. For it would
be possible for someone on the lowest tier of heaven to be happier; namely, if she
were on a higher tier of heaven. This, however, is no counterexample to Augustine’s argument. Augustine isn’t claiming that there is no state that the person
could be in and be happier; he is claiming that, as the person is, there is no state
that the person could be in and be happier. The blessed person on the lowest tier
is on the highest tier she can be on given her character. One might then wonder,
though, whether a damned individual (if there are such people) is also in a state of
“ultimate happiness” since, given the state of her soul there is no state she can be in
and be happier. A proponent of Augustine’s argument might respond by saying
that another necessary condition on being ultimately happy is being united to God
in a way that only the redeemed, and not the damned, are.
16
Augustine presents this sort of thought experiment for figuring out which
state would provide more happiness. One imagines two people in different states.
Whichever state is more to be desired (but not whichever state is more desired)
is the state that provides more happiness. One does this until one comes to a
state than which no more preferable state is imaginable. That is the state of true
happiness.
17
Furthermore, this concession strategy appears at odds, not only with the traditional teachings of the Christian church, but also with the Bible itself; for instance,
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The Concession Strategy does have the advantages of providing a robust notion of freedom and not falling into the problems of the compatibilist solution. Even with all those advantages, however, we still think it
should be rejected. For it is a Pyrrhic victory—one wins this particular
battle but loses the larger war. Concession is indeed an option, but it is an
option that should be taken only if all else fails.
§3 A Molinist Strategy
The above discussion of a Concession Strategy might lead one to reject (ii)
but deny that heavenly sin is a live possibility. Such a view would hold
that, while the redeemed can sin in heaven, for some reason or other, they
are kept from sinning. One such solution to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom utilizes Molinism. According to the Molinist, God pre-volitionally
knows what all possible created persons would freely do in every possible
circumstance. Such knowledge is called ‘middle knowledge,’ since it logically stands between God’s natural knowledge (His pre-volitional knowledge of necessary truths, sometimes also referred to as God’s knowledge
of simple intelligence) and His free knowledge (His post-volitional knowledge of contingent truths, sometimes also referred to as God’s knowledge
of vision). Like His natural knowledge, God’s middle knowledge is prevolitional; but like His free knowledge, it is knowledge of contingent
truths. In terms of providence, the most important objects of God’s middle
knowledge are His knowledge of what are called ‘counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.’18 A counterfactual of creaturely freedom is a contingent
proposition about how a creature would freely act in a particular situation. Such propositions have the following form:
If agent A were in circumstances C, A would freely do X.
Since Molinists are also incompatibilists, Molinism does not have the untoward consequences that the compatibilist solution has.
It seems then that one could use the Molinist’s understanding of divine
providence to provide a solution to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom.
Those in heaven could retain their libertarian freedom. But on the basis
of His middle knowledge, God could make sure that once in heaven, the
redeemed will find themselves only in circumstances in which they will
freely not sin. Let us call those circumstances which, were an agent to
find herself in that circumstance, she would freely not sin ‘sin-free circumstances’; similarly, let us call those circumstances in which an agent
would freely choose to do something sinful ‘sin-prone circumstances’.
This response to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom, which utilizes but is
not entailed by Molinism, is that on the basis of His middle knowledge,
when Paul speaks about the incorruptible crown that Christians win after a death
(1 Cor. 9:25), or the eternal inheritance to which the author of Hebrews refers (Heb
9:15), or, as Augustine cites in an earlier note, the eternal life and eternal punishment which Jesus foretells will follow his second coming (Matthew 25:46).
18
See Thomas Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1998), pp. 41ff.; see also Robert Adams, “An Anti-Molinist Argument,” Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991), p. 344.
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God providentially ensures that each of the redeemed finds herself only
in sin-free circumstances, and never in sin-prone circumstances. So while
it is true that the redeemed can sin, sinning is not a live possibility for the
redeemed due to God’s guidance.
While we agree that the Molinism solution is attractive in many ways,
there are a number of considerations that count against its adoption. First,
there are the well-known objections to Molinism itself, which we will not
elucidate here. While we are not claiming that these objections are fatal
to Molinism, we think that the metaphysical commitments required by
Molinism are a strike against it.
Additionally, and more seriously, this Molinism-inspired solution to
the Problem of Heavenly Freedom faces a dilemma. Either the redeemed
in heaven are such that it is possible for them to sin given their moral
characters, or it is not. If the former, then this solution does not do justice
to the heavenly perfection of the redeemed. The redeemed are supposed
to be perfected in heaven.19 But consider whether someone in these circumstances is rightly considered perfected. Suppose that Smith is prone to
adultery, or some other vicious action. But Smith’s wife knows this about
him. Suppose she knows the precise circumstances he would have to be
in to commit adultery, or even freely will to commit adultery. Now suppose she is very good at keeping him out of these circumstances such that
he is never again in adultery-prone circumstances. Extend the example a
bit more and suppose that she knows what circumstances he would have
to be in to perform any other sins as well. She also knows what circumstances he would have to be in to steal, for instance, and she keeps him out
of those circumstances that would lead him to will freely to steal. So now
Smith is in a pretty good state. No matter where he finds himself, provided
that his wife is watching over him, he won’t sin. But, we must ask, would
it be right to consider him perfected? It seems not. He isn’t transformed into
a morally perfect individual in virtue of his being kept in sin-free circumstances, any more than a coward is rendered courageous by being kept
away from the front lines. So if, as the first horn has it, the redeemed are
able to sin given their moral characters, then they are not perfected. But
the redeemed are perfected. So the first horn is not a viable option.
Consider, then, the other horn of the dilemma, according to which it
is not possible for the redeemed to sin given their moral characters. This
is the position that we develop and defend below in §5, and so we will
reserve our full discussion until then. But note here that if it is the case
that the moral character of the redeemed is perfected such that they are
no longer able to sin, then the truth of Molinism would be superfluous to
the Problem of Heavenly Freedom and one wouldn’t need to (or be able
to) reject (ii).
§4 Sennett’s Solution—Proximate Compatibilism
One last extant solution that we find good and interesting is that developed and defended by James Sennett.20 As we’ll see more fully below,
See, for instance, Hebrews 12:23.
See Sennett, “Is there Freedom in Heaven?”

19
20
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Sennett thinks that free will is compatible with an agent’s being determined in certain ways, provided that the agent brings about this determination by earlier free and undetermined activity. According to Sennett’s
view, insofar as humans on earth have free will, determinism must be
false. Agents can, however, use their free will to form their moral characters in such a way that they are determined to act in certain ways. So
long as the moral character that determines them was itself freely formed,
Sennett does not think that this sort of self-imposed determinism rules out
free will. In fact, it is along precisely these lines that Sennett understands
heavenly freedom. After death, the redeemed in heaven are determined
by their own freely formed character in such a way that certain choices
and actions are no longer possible. Sennett goes even further than claiming that certain choices and actions are not possible in heaven; he goes
on to claim that there is no libertarian free will in heaven at all. He writes
that his view “allows that the good manifested by libertarian freedom be
present in heaven, though there is no libertarian freedom there.”21 Sennett
writes, “I will call this conception of compatibilist freedom—under which
compatibilist free actions are causally dependent on libertarian actions—
the Proximate Conception.”22
It seems reasonable to think that there are some actions that are determined, but have not always been determined. For instance, given the
moral character of a person—let’s call her Teresa—it might be true that
she is determined not to swindle money from a homeless shelter in order
to pay for a luxurious vacation for herself insofar as she sees no good
or motivating reason for engaging in such behavior. She hasn’t always
had that character, however; perhaps at some earlier time she would have
been open to embezzling. And, on the assumption of incompatibilism,
she wasn’t causally determined to have the kind of moral character that
sees no good reason to take funds from the homeless shelter to finance a
luxury. She could have formed her character such that swindling money
from the poor to finance a vacation wouldn’t sound half bad to her. We
could say in this case that, while it hasn’t always been the case that she is
determined not to swindle the money from the homeless shelter, it is now
the case that she is determined not to do so. We might also say that, while
she once was undetermined with respect to swindling the money from
the homeless shelter, it is no longer the case that she is undetermined with
respect to this particular action. Put another way, we could say that while
she wasn’t remotely determined not to swindle, she is proximately determined
not to swindle, and while whether or not she swindled was remotely undetermined, it is not proximately undetermined.

21
Ibid., p. 77. Putting the point as Sennett does here makes it sound as if there
are multiple kinds of free will: the kind that (some) compatibilists believe in, and
the kind that libertarians think we have. We think it’s better to say that there is
only one kind of free will—the kind that everyone who believes in free will thinks
we have—and that the disagreement between compatibilists and incompatibilists
is over what conditions must be met (or not met) in order for agents to have that
kind of free will.
22
Ibid., p. 75.
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In order to explain more fully the Proximate Conception of compatibilism, here are Sennett’s definitions of those four italicized terms:
Remote Determinationdf = “an event is remotely determined just in case the
laws of nature and the state of the world at any given time prior to
the event entail that the event will occur.”23
Proximate Determinationdf = “an event is proximately determined just in
case the laws of nature and the state of the world at some time immediately prior to the event entail that the event will occur.”24
Remote Undeterminationdf = “an event is remotely undetermined just in
case there is some time in the past such that the laws of nature and
the state of the world at that time do not entail that the event will
occur.”25
Proximate Undeterminationdf = “an event is proximately undetermined just
in case there is no time in the past such that the laws of nature
and the state of the world at that time entail that the event will
occur.”26
Notice that, given these definitions, there is logical space for a free act of
an agent to be proximately determined by earlier actions which themselves were undetermined. Perhaps previous undetermined free actions
shaped the individual’s character such that the individual’s later acts
are proximately determined (though not remotely determined) by the
individual’s character. In such circumstances, the later freedom traces
back to the earlier freedom.27 Our potential swindler is still free when
she doesn’t swindle. As Sennett writes, “the notion of a free action over
which there is no agent control at the time it was performed, but which
is such that there must be agent controlled events in the past that led to
the determination of the event, is not ruled absurd.”28 Thus this fourfold distinction allows for an action to be free which is determined by
an individual’s character, while still insisting that the falsity of determinism—determinism understood as the doctrines of (remote) causal or

23
Ibid., p. 72. Sennett goes on immediately to say: “That is, for every time t prior
to time t* at which the event occurs, the laws of nature and the state of the world
at t entail the occurrence of the event at t*.”
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
For a discussion about the role that tracing plays in free action, see Robert
Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press,
2005), pp. 80ff. and Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996), pp. 37ff.
28
Sennett, “Is there Freedom in Heaven?,” p. 73. We think this is too strong of a
claim. For our forthcoming position, one needn’t affirm that there are free actions
over which there is no agential control. Our position allows each action an agent
takes to be under her control, as we show below.
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theological determinism—is required for free will.29 One can form one’s
character through free actions in such a way that one’s later willings are
constricted by that character. Those later constricted willings, according
to Sennett, are nonetheless free.30
We think that Sennett’s solution to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom
has numerous benefits. For instance, it avoids the problems of the previous solutions. Remember the objection to the compatibilist solution: that
the problem of evil is made more intractable by compatibilism, since God
could have made a world that he determined to be freely without sin but
he didn’t. Sennett’s answer is that God couldn’t have actualized a world in
which humans are free from the start and also are incapable of sin in virtue of being determined never to sin. This is because, according to Sennett,
an agent can be free at time t only if that agent is undetermined at t or such
that what determines the agent’s actions at t is the result of previous free
and undetermined choices of that agent. Since both conditions for human
freedom require freedom as understood by incompatibilists, God cannot
create a world with free humans who are determined in every action. So
given that freedom is such a great good, and given that it’s possible that
the only way God could actualize it is if He bore the possibility of human
agents performing evil, free will can provide God a morally sufficient reason for the existence of moral evil.
Additionally, Sennett’s view gives a way of understanding the claim
that the blessed can’t fall from heaven. Given their past actions, once in
heaven they are incapable of sinning. And sinning is a necessary condition
of falling from heaven. So Sennett’s view doesn’t run afoul of the nature of
heavenly bliss, like the Concession Strategy does.
Finally, Sennett’s solution avoids the problems we point out for the Molinist solution. Sennett’s theory allows for the blessed to be rightly called
‘perfected’ in heaven. Furthermore, this perfected state in heaven allows
for Sennett to give a principled reason for why all of the redeemed can be
kept in sin-free circumstances whereas those on earth, at least it appears,
cannot be.31
Even with all these benefits, we think there are places where Sennett’s
solution could be improved upon. For, as we noted earlier, there is no
libertarian free will in heaven on Sennett’s solution. According to Sennett,
It is for this reason that we think that Sennett’s view is not a species of compatibilism.
30
One might think that Sennett is right about the constriction, but decline to
label such willings free. However, if one understands free will to be the control
condition for moral responsibility, as we do, then if these later willings are ones
for which the agent can be morally responsible, they would need to involve free
will. For descriptions of free will as the control condition on moral responsibility, see Kane, The Significance of Free Will, pp. 4f.; Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, p. 80. Some libertarians prefer to define a free action in such a
way that proximately determined actions cannot be free. For reasons against
defining free will in this way, see Timpe, Free Will: Sourcehood and Its Alternatives,
pp. 9ff.
31
Possible exceptions to this claim are Jesus and, according to some theologies,
the Virgin Mary. To avoid complexities that need not concern us here, we are setting aside these issues for present purposes.
29
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the actions and choices of the redeemed are determined by the character
that they formed on earth, and since they are thus determined, they are
not free in the libertarian sense. We think that Sennett’s claim that there
is no non-derivative freedom in heaven is both too strong and not necessitated by the position that he lays out. In the following section we will
present a solution that allows for non-derivative freedom in heaven while
precluding heavenly sins.
§5 A Preferable Solution
Our position is very much like Sennett’s. We think that during preheavenly existence a person has the ability to form a moral character which
later precludes that person from willing certain things. For instance, neither author of this paper can will to torture an innocent child for a nickel.32
Our characters are such that we cannot will that; we simply cannot see a
good reason for engaging in such behavior. But it doesn’t follow that we
aren’t free, particularly given that our evaluative conclusions are not necessitated products of causally external forces. We are free in that we can
choose to perform morally good actions, but our freely formed characters
preclude us from doing morally bad actions insofar as those characters
lead us to evaluate reasons for acting, or not acting, in certain ways. (We
discuss an objection from significant freedom in the following section.)
Furthermore, we are not missing out on something terribly good by being unable to will that particular action. As a matter of fact, we think we
would be less good persons if we could will such an action.33
One might wonder how it is that one’s character could preclude certain actions. We think that one’s character directs decisions by both influencing what one sees as reasons for actions and influencing how one
weighs reasons for and against those actions. To put this point a slightly
different way, in making free decisions, one’s character affects not only
the weights; it also affects the scales. Both of these aspects can be seen as
follows. First, as stated above, given our present moral characters we can
see no good reason to torture a child for a nickel (i.e., the nickel is not a
good reason). Furthermore, we weigh the good of having a nickel against
the goods of the child’s bodily and psychological integrity and find that
the child’s welfare wins. Our characters are involved insofar as if we were
more avaricious, we may find monetary gain, even small monetary gain,
a good reason to inflict bodily harm on another. Similarly, if we were less
empathetic, we may weigh the good of monetary gain more heavily than
we do against the good of an innocent child’s welfare.
32
Here we are assuming that the nickel in question has the standard worth of
a nickel, that we aren’t being controlled by mind control devices, etc. The whole
story here is that someone offers us a nickel to torture the child. We borrow this
example from Eleonore Stump’s “Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility: The Flicker of Freedom,” The Journal of Ethics 3.4 (1999), p. 323.
33
In fact, Augustine thinks that free will that is never used for evil, what he calls
‘genuine freedom,’ is the highest kind of freedom. See Augustine On Free Choice
of the Will, trans. Thoms Williams (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999), p. xviii. A similar
view is developed in Timothy O’Connor in “Freedom with a Human Face,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (2005), pp. 207–227.
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Likewise, consider Teresa again. Her character determines that she not
swindle from the homeless shelter. But were her character more vicious—
say, by being less temperate and just—she may see the good of a luxurious vacation as a very great good and give it more weight against the
good of social justice and the welfare of the poor. The better her character (at least with respect to certain virtues), the weaker the reasons
for swindling appear to her, and the less weight she accords them in
her judgments. At some high level of character, the action of swindling
from the poor for the sake of a luxurious vacation would appear so repugnant to her that she just couldn’t bring herself to do it—she is incapable, given her character, of freely willing to swindle for the sake of the
luxurious vacation.34
In heaven, the blessed will be incapable of willing any sin, just as we
are incapable of willing the particular sin of torturing an innocent child
for a nickel, and just as Teresa is incapable of willing to swindle from a
homeless shelter for a luxurious vacation. This will be because of the character the redeemed have formed in their pre-heavenly existence. Given
the perfection of their character, they will see no reason to engage in sinful
and wicked actions. This doesn’t mean that they won’t be free, however.
At the very least, as seen in the preceding section on Sennett’s view, the
redeemed in heaven could be derivatively free; that is, even if all the decisions of the blessed in heaven were determined by their characters and the
reasons they see for acting in various ways, that by itself wouldn’t render
them unfree.
Nevertheless, it would be better to claim that not only is there derivative free will in heaven, but also non-derivative freedom as well. The
question here is what is the relation between one’s character and one’s
actions in heaven? On our view, even if one’s character determines that
one not perform certain actions, it doesn’t determine all the actions that
one does perform; rather, one’s freely chosen moral character underdetermines at least some of one’s actions.35 For instance, consider the choice
either to sing in the heavenly choir or to play the harp. If both of these
actions are consistent with the nature of heaven and one sees good reasons for engaging in both activities, then one’s moral character needn’t
determine one’s choice either way. If it is true that one can either choose
to play the harp or choose to sing with the same perfected moral character, this choice shows that there can be non-derivative free choices even in
heaven. In other words, we think it better to say that our moral characters,
and the reasons we see for acting in various ways as a result of having
those characters, don’t determine all the actions we do perform, but they
do preclude those actions we cannot perform. That is, while our characters
in heaven don’t determine that we sing songs of joy, they do preclude
that we drop-kick the apostles. While our characters don’t determine
that we run, plow and play, they do preclude that we rape, pillage and
plunder. So we retain non-derivative free will, but our theory says it is
34
This sort of inability can be understood in terms of conditional or hypothetical
necessity.
35
This claim is, of course, consistent with the further claim that our character
determines many of our actions in heaven.
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circumscribed—even if not fully—by the moral characters that we have
previously formed.36
One might wonder if all the free choices one may make in heaven are
as trivial and unimportant as whether one plays a harp or sings (that is,
if one thinks that such choices are trivial and unimportant), rather than
being morally important choices. On our view, the blessed are free to will
any number of interesting and morally relevant actions that they see good
reason for doing. At any one given time, a blessed individual in heaven
can will to pray for all of her descendents, all of her Godchildren, or just
one particular good friend. One’s character needn’t determine which of
these actions one performs. But insofar as praying for others is a morally relevant action rather than merely being trivial, then the blessed in
heaven have freedom—freedom that is relevant to their moral state—that
is not determined. Thus, we don’t say, as Sennett does (when he claims
that all heavenly actions are proximately determined and that “there is
no libertarian freedom [in heaven]”37), that all actions of the blessed are
determined by their characters, or even that all important and interesting
actions are determined.
Our position is similar in many places to Aquinas’ view on heavenly
freedom. Aquinas holds that the ability to do evil isn’t essential to having free will. Once the defects in one’s intellect and will are removed, the
will is still free, but is no longer able to do evil; being able to will evil is
accidental, not essential, to free will.38 Furthermore, while the blessed are
free and incapable of sinning due to their characters determining that they
not perform morally evil actions, they are still able to perform morally

36
Objecting to an aspect of Sennett’s view, Nagasawa et al. write: “It is not plausible to think that there are—or ever have been—any people whose characters are
such that, when they die, it is logically impossible for them to make evil choices.
It is also not plausible to think that there are—or ever have been—any people
whose characters are such that, when they die, the features of those characters
that bear on any choice that that person might make in Heaven are as they are
solely because of libertarian free choices that that person made during his life”
(Nagasawa, Oppy, and Trakakis, “Salvation in Heaven?,” pp. 110f.). It seems to us
that the traditional doctrine of purgatory allows the soul to continue forming the
proper dispositions and character without an ad hoc extension of Sennett’s view.
Here we are thinking of the approach to purgatory and its role in character formation that is at the heart of Dante’s Divine Comedy, as well as Jerry Walls’ account
of purgatory in chapter 2 of Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002).
37
Sennett, “Is there Freedom in Heaven?,” p. 77.
38
Aquinas writes: “We note a second difference regarding which there can be
free choice as the difference between good and evil. But this difference does not
intrinsically belong to the power of free choice but is incidentally related to the
power inasmuch as natures capable of defect have such free choice. . . . And so
nothing prevents there being a power of free choice that so strives for good that it
is in no way capable of striving for evil, whether by nature, as in the case of God,
or by the perfection of grace, as in the case of the saints and the holy angels” (De
Malo, On Evil, trans. Richard J. Regan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003),
q.16, a.5, response).

412

Faith and Philosophy

relevant and important actions.39 One might worry that, for Aquinas, the
blessed do not have alternate possibilities open to them, especially since
Aquinas claims that the blessed are unchangeable in their will.40 This
might be seen as a place where our view parts company with Aquinas’,
since we claim that the blessed are able to will and choose among distinct
goods in heaven.
This worry can be dispelled if we look at what Aquinas says about the
will of Christ. He writes:
The will of Christ, though determined to good, is not determined to
this or that good. Hence it pertains to Christ, even as to the blessed,
to choose with a free will confirmed in good.41
So, for Aquinas, being able to do evil isn’t essential to having free will.
One can be free and perform morally relevant actions, even if one’s character determines that one cannot perform morally evil actions. Even if
the blessed are determined not to sin, they are still able to choose freely
among alternate goods.42
There are many reasons to accept this theory we present. In fact, it has
all the benefits we’ve mentioned of the views canvassed. First, the incompatibilist view of freedom has been held by many in the Christian tradition, just as compatibilism has. Second, it emphasizes the importance of a
39
Aquinas writes: “There is a necessity of compulsion: and this lessens the praise
due to virtue, since it is opposed to what is voluntary; for compulsion is contrary to
the will.—But there is another necessity resulting from an interior inclination. This
does not diminish but increases the praise due to a virtuous act: because it makes
the will tend to the act of virtue more intensely. For it is clear that the more perfect
is a habit of virtue, the more strongly does it make the will tend to the virtuous
good, and the less liable to deflect from it. And when virtue has attained its perfect
end, it brings with it a kind of necessity for good action, for instance in the Blessed, who
cannot sin, as we shall show further on: and yet the will is not, for that reason, any the less
free, or the act less good” (Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, trans. English Dominicans
(London: Burns, Oates, and Washbourne, 1934), bk. 3b, chap. 138; emphasis ours).
Compare what Aquinas says here to what we say about the strength of Teresa’s
character and her ability to will to swindle from the homeless shelter.
40
For instance: “the soul that is beatified immediately after death, becomes unchangeable in its will” (Summa contra gentiles, bk. 4, chap. 92). By claiming that the
will is unchangeable, Aquinas means, as the context clearly shows, that the will of
the blessed is unable to will evil and is unchangeable from the good, and not that it is
unable to change among goods. The quotation following this note lends additional
support to this claim.
41
Aquinas, Summa theologiae, III q.18 a.4 ad.3.
42
The view that the freedom of the redeemed is a freedom to choose among
alternate goods isn’t idiosyncratic to Aquinas. In fact, one finds it in the 1910 Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: Robert Appleton Company) entry on Heaven, which
says: “The blessed are confirmed in good; they can no longer commit even the
slightest venial sin; every wish of their heart is inspired by the purest love of God.
That is, beyond doubt, Catholic doctrine. Moreover this impossibility of sinning is
physical. The blessed have no longer the power of choosing to do evil actions; they
cannot but love God; they are merely free to show that love by one good action in
preference to another.”
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robust form of free will, just as the Concession Strategy does. Third, it protects against the live possibility of sin in heaven, as the Molinist Strategy
does. Lastly, its reliance on character formation and the reasons agents
recognize for acting in various ways because of that character provides
a way of showing how the ability to sin may be curtailed in heaven, but
curtailed as a freely willed consequence of one’s free will.
What of the reasons we gave to reject the previous views? Are any of
them applicable to our view? We think not. First, our view avoids the objection to compatibilism concerning the problem of evil in the same way
Molinism and Sennett’s view do. Secondly, it doesn’t require a doctrinal
concession like the Concession Strategy does. Thirdly, it doesn’t fall short
of perfection for the redeemed, as the Molinist Strategy does. Finally,
our theory allows for non-derivatively free actions in heaven while precluding sinful actions in a way consonant with our freedom. The blessed
still have a range of important, non-trivial free choices they can make,
though all the bad choices are excluded by free acts of their own (nondetermined) willing.
However, even if our theory retains all the benefits of the previous
theories and avoids all their deficiencies, that doesn’t mean that it doesn’t
have its own pitfalls. What of objections to our solution?
§6 Objections and Rebuttals
One potential objection to our solution to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom is that it brings with it heresy. According to this objection, even if
the position advocated in this paper saves the traditional view of heaven
from problems, it does so only at the cost of rejecting the traditional view
of grace and embracing a heretical position—Pelagianism, the view that
one can earn or merit one’s way to heaven apart from a unique grace
given by God.43 The proposed view removes from God the ability to cause
primarily anything that a secondary cause could cause, since God can’t
cause me to have a perfect character, but I can. The solution makes all virtues acquired and doesn’t allow God the dignity (or possibility) of infusing
them Himself.
In response to this objection, we claim that our view allows for God’s
grace to play an important role in the formation of characters. All that it
requires is that our free cooperation plays some role in our moral formation as well. But, even there, our position doesn’t require that one earn
the ability to cooperate in salvation or that a unique grace isn’t required.
We make no claims here either way about whether one has the ability
to cooperate in one’s salvation (our view is thus neutral with respect to
43
Pelagius’s view is often falsely portrayed as one according to which a human
agent is able to will the good apart from grace. Pelagius consistently maintained
that the giving of human nature is itself a grace; thus, even on his account, grace
is required for an individual to will the good. This grace is sometimes referred to
as ‘enabling grace’ or ‘the grace of creation’. What Pelagius denied is that a further
grace—sometimes called ‘cooperative grace’ or what Augustine calls ‘a unique
grace’—is also required for a fallen human to turn toward God. For a further discussion of these issues, see Kevin Timpe, “Grace and Controlling What We Do Not
Cause,” Faith and Philosophy 24.3 (2007), pp. 284–299.
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issues of Divine Monergism and Divine Synergism44). What we do claim
is that one has the ability to cooperate with God in one’s coming to a
morally perfect character—a logically necessary, but undoubtedly causally
insufficient condition for final salvation, that is, for one’s unending future existence in heaven.45 We can (and do) keep the initial infusion of
God’s saving grace as God’s gratuitous prerogative. So the gratuity isn’t
stricken from our account.
As for the charge that our view strips God of the causal powers due to
Him—the power of being able to cause anything Himself that a creature
of His could cause, or the ability to infuse a perfect character into His
creatures—we deny the charge. Nothing we say entails that God couldn’t
determine a perfect character in anyone. If God wanted, He could infuse a
perfectly formed character into us right now. He couldn’t, however, both
do that and keep us free at the same time. And if having free will is essential to having a moral character, then God couldn’t unilaterally infuse
a perfected moral character into us. This is no problem for God’s omnipotence, since it is not a limitation of God’s power that He is not able to do
what can’t be done at all.46
A second objection to our view is suggested by Michael Martin, who
writes that “it is doubtful” that the traditional view can be reconciled with
“standard defenses against the Argument from Evil such as the Free Will
Defense.”47 He elaborates as follows:
The FWD [i.e., the Free Will Defense] provides an explanation of
why there is so much moral evil: human beings misuse their free will
and cause evil. God does not interfere with these choices for to do so
would be to interfere with free will. . . . If God could have actualized
a world with free will in which Heaven is an essential part, it is difficult to see why He did not actualize a world with free will that is
heavenly in its entirety.48

One might, of course, have others reasons for preferring Divine Synergism
over Divine Monergism, or vice versa. What we claim here is that our account of
heavenly freedom does not, strictly speaking, rule out either option nor entail that
one view is to be preferred over the other.
45
This is a position concerning sanctification that even Divine Monergists should
be happy to accept.
46
See, for instance, Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, I q. 25 a. 3, resp: “God is called
omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible absolutely . . . everything
that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible
things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies
contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it
cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them.”
47
Michael Martin, “Problems with Heaven,” Secular Web Library: Essays on
Atheism and Religious Disbelief (1997), http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/heaven.html.
48
Ibid. See also George B. Wall, “Heaven and a Wholly Good God,” Personalist
58 (1977), pp. 352–357.
44
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Martin argues here that if God could make a world with heaven as a
proper part, He could make a world that is wholly and entirely heavenly.
But then, why didn’t He? Why allow all the horrors of the world? Those
evils aren’t necessary for the good of free will, on the traditional account,
since heaven has free will and heaven has none of those horrors. Think
of it this way: consider the world at some time, t, after the Final Judgment, when all the redeemed are in heaven, and all the damned (if such
there be) are in hell. Why couldn’t God create the world with t as its first
instant? Creating such a world would avoid all the evils of the world, but
still include the great good of free will. If we have no good answer to this
objection, our theory has the same disadvantage as the compatibilist solution—it makes the logical problem of evil more intractable.
On our theory, it doesn’t follow from God’s ability to actualize a world
that contains freedom and no moral evil or sin as a proper part that God
can actualize a world that contains freedom and no moral evil or sin in
its entirety. On the view that we are advocating, if a non-divine agent is
free and has a moral character that precludes sin, there must have been
a prior time when that agent was free and didn’t have a moral character
that precludes sin.49 The only way, on our view, that a non-divine person
can be free and have a moral character precluding of sin is if that person
previously freely formed her moral character into one that precludes sin.
So if God were to bring a world into existence that is intrinsically identical
with this world from t forward, while the denizens of the actual world
would be free, the denizens of the second world would not be insofar as
they are remotely determined.
The most serious objection to our account is the following. One might
claim that while our account preserves free will in heaven, it does so at
the expense of not preserving the presence of significant free will in heaven.50 As Alvin Plantinga defines it; a person has significant free will only if
that individual is “free with respect to an action that is morally significant
for him,”51 where an action is morally significant for a person at a given
time “if it would be wrong for him to perform the action then but right to
refrain, or vice versa.”52 Significant free will is thus a robust, non-trivial
freedom of the will. If God were to create beings who could choose freely
only once, and then only between two morally neutral options, it would
be true to say that such creatures have free will, but it would be false to say
that they have significant free will.
Furthermore, as defined by Plantinga, a person is significantly free with
respect to an action only if either the performance of that action or refraining from performing that action is morally wrong, and the person is free to
act or to refrain from acting. If a person freely chooses between two morally good options, say giving money to Oxfam or giving money to a local
49
The qualifier ‘non-divine’ here is needed due to issues arising from the freedom
of God Himself. Insofar as our concern in the present paper is with the freedom of
the redeemed rather than with God Himself, this restriction is appropriate.
50
We thank Tom Flint for raising and pressing this objection.
51
Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, p. 166. See also Plantinga, God, Freedom and
Evil, p. 30.
52
Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, p. 166.
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homeless shelter, then such a choice would not be significantly free. Given
Plantinga’s definition of significant freedom, all supererogatory choices
fail to be significantly free as well, since, by definition, it is not wrong
to refrain from performing a particular supererogatory action. The only
significantly free choices we have, on Plantinga’s account of significant
freedom, are those that are between morally right and morally wrong options. And given that on the account of heavenly freedom we defended
above the redeemed do not have the ability to choose anything morally
wrong, it follows that the redeemed in heaven do not have significant free
will in Plantinga’s sense of the term.
Given the way that Plantinga has defined what it is to be significantly
free, the core of the objection is true: the redeemed lack significant free
will so defined. What we dispute, however, is that this is a serious objection to our view. There are three reasons we so object.
First, there is something untoward about Plantinga’s definition here,
as it suggests that any choice that does not involve at least one morally
wrong alternative is not morally significant. As the Oxfam example illustrates, this need not be the case; for when one is choosing between multiple
but mutually exclusive morally good options, whatever one chooses will
be morally significant in the sense that each option carries moral weight,
though it will not be morally significant in Plantinga’s sense. To use a
more sinister example, say that Satan freely becomes so vicious that he
can no longer perform morally praiseworthy actions. As an out-flowing of
his vicious character, he wants to punish Teresa for her virtuous behavior.
And given his devilish nature, he cannot choose an option that is morally
good. But should he avenge her virtue by defiling her children with painful boils, send his demons to tear her limb from limb, or simply torture her
to death himself? Since none of these options is morally good, it follows
from Plantinga’s definition that this choice is not a significantly free choice
for Satan, despite the fact that each of the options he is considering in the
choice carries moral weight.
In the spirit of Plantinga’s definition, we define a morally relevant
choice as follows: a choice is morally relevant iff the person is free to
choose among at least two options, and at least two of the options, say,
A and B, are related such that either A is better than B or B is better
than A. Similarly, we say that a person has morally relevant freedom if she
is free with respect to a choice that is morally relevant to her. Though
not all instances of morally relevant freedom will also be instances of
morally significant freedom as defined by Plantinga,53 there is another
sense in which such choices are morally significant—that is, they all
carry moral weight. They carry moral weight for at least two reasons.
First, one can rightly judge someone to be a better person for choosing
to perform a supererogatory action, even if refraining wouldn’t make
her a morally bad person in any way. So morally relevant choices—such
as the choice of whether to perform a supererogatory action—can properly affect our moral judgments even if those choices are not morally
significant in Plantinga’s sense. Furthermore, morally relevant choices
However, on these definitions, the set of morally significant choices will be a
sub-set of those that are morally relevant.
53
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carry moral weight insofar as they affect our characters. That is, the more
supererogatory choices one makes, the better person one becomes, and
this even if refraining from those supererogatory choices wouldn’t make
one a worse person.
The second reason we do not believe the objection from morally significant freedom to be serious is because there is nothing about the Free
Will Defense that requires significant freedom in heaven. The Free Will
Defense requires morally significant freedom during some span of time to
serve as the greater good that is possibly God’s reason for allowing moral
evil—it does not require morally significant freedom at all times to serve
as the greater good that is possibly God’s reason for allowing moral evil.
Since the process of forming one’s character in the way outlined above
involves having choices on earth about actions that it would be wrong to
perform but right to refrain from, or vice versa, our view preserves the
importance of and need for morally significant freedom while on earth,
just as does the Free Will Defense. However, if one thinks that there are
other possible reasons God could have which justify the existence of evil
besides the existence of morally significant freedom, we see no reason to
think that our account of heavenly freedom would be incompatible with
these reasons. For instance, suppose one adopted a Soul-Making Defense
on which the possibility of moral evil is required on earth for soul-making.
Such a possibility would not be required in heaven because the souls are,
so to speak, already made.
Our final response to the objection from morally significant freedom is
related to the second, and that is to question the motivation for preserving
morally significant freedom, rather than simply morally relevant freedom,
in heaven. An essentially omnibenevolent God is, by definition, unable to
have morally significant freedom in Plantinga’s sense. And we see no reason to insist that the redeemed will have a kind of freedom that God does
not have, particularly when the having of that freedom indicates a failing
of moral character in the redeemed.54 So far as we can tell, there is no
motivation for insisting that the redeemed have significant freedom rather
than just morally relevant freedom. And since morally relevant freedom is
a robust, non-trivial sort of freedom, we see no loss in denying significant
freedom in heaven, in Plantinga’s sense, and affirming morally relevant
freedom in heaven.
An objection that arises here concerns whether the choices of the
redeemed in heaven can truly have moral weight on our definition of
moral relevance.55 A central part of our picture of heaven is the claim
that the blessed in heaven have perfect moral characters, and that these
characters, though precluding significantly free acts (by precluding evil
choices), leave open the possibility of morally relevant actions. Two reasons we give for why performing a morally relevant action carries moral
weight are because one can rightly judge someone to be a better person for choosing to perform a supererogatory action, even if refraining
wouldn’t make her a morally bad person in any way, and because the
54
We think there are reasons to claim that God does, in fact, have morally relevant
freedom. However, space does not permit an exploration of those reasons here.
55
We owe this objection, and much of its wording, to Tom Flint.
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more supererogatory choices one makes, the better person one becomes,
and this even if refraining from those supererogatory choices wouldn’t
make one a worse person. Now, if someone’s in heaven, we already
know that he has a perfect moral character, for that’s a necessary condition of his being in heaven. But if one of the redeemed, say, Andrew, has
a perfect moral character, how could he be judged “a better person” if he
chooses to perform A rather than B, where neither A nor B is evil but A
is better than B? And how can the choices he makes affect his character if
he already, as one of the blessed in heaven, has a perfect moral character?
How can he become better, by making more supererogatory choices, if
he has already attained moral perfection? If our account cannot provide
another way of finding moral weight in morally relevant actions for the
redeemed, it seems like our account only provides morally trivial freedom for them.
In response, let us distinguish two ways of being morally perfect, one
of which admits of an upper limit, while the other does not. Consider
a moral virtue, say, temperance. In one sense, being perfectly temperate
is being precisely on the mean of temperance, not leaning toward either
gluttony or insensibility. Once you are on the mean, you can’t get any
more on the mean. So, in this sense, once you are morally perfect, you can’t
become any more morally perfect.
But there is also a second sense of being perfected in virtue, and that’s
how tenaciously one clings to the mean once one is on it. A drunkard fresh
to sobriety might be on the mean, but he can also be ever so lightly straddling it—a strong breeze could knock him off. However, someone who has
been sober for twenty years may have a tenacious grasp on sobriety—he
can stay sober in the face of temptation that would lead the newly sober
man to the drink. Both are precisely on the mean, but one clings to it more
tightly. This second sort of perfection, for all we know, doesn’t admit of an
upper limit. One can always cling more tightly to the mean.
It seems to us at least possible that a person can cling to the mean to
such an extent that he can’t fall from it, but he could nevertheless still
cling tighter. If that is possible, then the redeemed in heaven are such that
they are perfected in the first sense, being squarely on the mean, and perfected in the second sense insofar as they cling to the mean so tenaciously
that they can’t but remain there, but are nevertheless such that they could
always cling tighter. Their morally relevant choices bring them to cling
ever tighter to the mean, and we can judge them to be better for choosing
supererogatory actions insofar as such choices bring them to cling more
tenaciously to the mean. And, we should note, that if we think about clinging to the good rather than clinging to the mean, we can say that through
the everlasting years that the blessed spend with God, they are neverendingly coming ever closer to Him, who is Goodness itself, ever clinging
more tenaciously to Him.56
Finally, one might reject our theory if one has arguments against incompatibilism or doesn’t desire an orthodox answer to the Problem of Heav56
We are reminded here of the end of last book of The Chronicles of Narnia, The
Last Battle, where Aslan calls the Lords and Ladies of Narnia to come ever “Further
Up and Further In” to the Real Narnia, heaven.
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enly Freedom. We readily admit that we haven’t provided an argument
for incompatibilism or the traditional view of heaven. But for those who
are inclined to both incompatibilism and traditional Christianity, we think
that our view is the best solution to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom.57
University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, MN
University of San Diego, San Diego, CA

A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2007 Pacific Region
Society of Christian Philosophers Conference, held at Azusa Pacific University,
where we benefited from questions and comments by Harriet Baber, John Martin Fischer, David Hunt, Gordon Pettit, Mike Rea, Dan Speak, Tom Talbott, and
Manuel Vargas. We have also benefited from helpful discussions at the Prosblogion
blog, as well as from feedback by Mike Almeida, Christopher Callaway, Shawn
Floyd, Tim O’Keefe, Faith Glavey Pawl, Alexander Pruss, Eleonore Stump, Neal
Tognazzini, David Werther, and Matt Zwolinski. The editor of Faith and Philosophy,
Tom Flint, as well as two anonymous referees for the journal provided extensive,
and probing, comments and criticisms. Writing of this paper was made possible,
in part, by a fellowship at the Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University
of Notre Dame.
57

